Adam Smith s social theory analyzes and interprets both the unfolding and accumulative structures of human nature and society while considering the foundation of human instinct My reinterpretation makes it possible to achieve a coherent understand
The purpose of this essay is to suggest on the basis of a precise examination of Adam Smith s conception of instinct -mainly scrutinized in his posthumous article Of the External Senses ES hereafter -that his social theory analyzes and inter-prets both the unfolding and accumulative structures of human nature and society while considering the foundation of human instinct in a biological sense This approach has therefore some bearing on recent works that focus on the importance of a biological ap-proach to Smith Schabas 2003; 2005 as well as the methodological similarities between Smith s theory of sympathy and Darwin s evolutionary understanding of the human species Evensky 2005; Laurent and Cockfield 2007 As to biology two facts seem to be immediately noteworthy First Smith s letter to Andreas Holt October 1789 says that he studied botany with no great progress while writing Wealth of Nations 1776; WN hereafter at Kirkaldy COR 252 ; botany was the name given at that time to the discipline now known as biology with the latter being a term used since the beginning of the 1800s Farber 2000 The posthumous article ES is usually looked at from the point of view of philosophical psychology rather than that of natural philosophy ; it is guessed that it was written before Smith became closely acquainted with Hume -that is before 1752 Wightman 1980 speculates that ES was written prior to 1752 before Smith was closely acquainted with Hume 133-34 This interpretation seems perfectly sound and persuasive for the first half of the essay; however Wightman s appreciation of the latter half of the essay and the fact that Smith s careful field observations on animals re-veals his genius seems to be inadequate and superficial: no explanation is provided as to why Smith had to extend his observations of animals there It might well be that the latter half of ES including the greater part of the section Of the Sense of Seeing was written after 1766-68 when the 12th edition of Linnaeus s Systema Naturae was published and stocked in Adam Smith s library Unlike earlier editions that show his arrangements and nomenclature to the learned the 10th edition adopted definitions of Classes and Orders of animals that were suitable for use even by amateurs Cain 1992 245-46 ; it was also expanded to 1 384 pages from the previous edition s 227 eventually reaching 2 299 pages in the 12th edition That both the new Order Gralae and the Class Mammalia coined by Linnaeus in the 10th edition of Systema Naturae in 1758 are used by Smith in the latter part of the article has been pointed out by Brown 1992 334 Rather than be considered a meritorious finding Brown s estimation of the dating of ES between 1758 and October 1759 has been challenged by Smith scholars since these facts are incidental rather than essential to Smith s argument Ross 1995 104; Schabas 2003 266-67 fn However it cannot be overlooked that the animal kingdom Linnaeus divides into six classes and to each he adds their generic and specific characters; before him nobody had clearly distinguished the Vermes from the Insects Engel- Ledeboer and Engel 1964 9 Smith mentions Linnaeus toward the end of his article: That numerous division of animals which Linnaeus ranks under the class of worms have scarcely any of them any head They neither see nor hear have neither eyes nor ears: but many of them have the power of self-motion and appear to move about in search of their food ES 83 We recognize that Smith s understanding of biology as witnessed in ES had greatly surpassed that seen in The History of Astronomy probably written before 1758; HA hereafter in which he says that all things endowed with a power of self-motion beasts birds fishes insects are classed under the general name of Animal HA II 1 This shows clearly that Smith had no knowledge of Wermes worms when writing HA It seems appropriate therefore to seek evidence in dating ES-first to carry out a reinterpretation of ES; second to compare Smith s biological conception of instinct with Locke s philosophical and Hume s psychological and physiological conceptions; and third to survey Smith s references to instinct from his A Letter to the Authors of the Edinburgh Review to the sixth edition of The Theory of Moral Sentiments
I The Dating of ES: Smith s Interest in the Instinctive Power of Perception
In the latter part of ES Smith tries to establish three propositions First four classes of sensations-namely heat and cold taste smell and sound-are not naturally perceived as external and independent substances or even as qualities of such substances but as mere affections of the organs; they can exist nowhere but in the organs ES 25 says Smith and the different degrees of these sensations altogether result from experiences Second the genuine possibility that neither man nor animal was ever born without the sense of touch which seems essential to and inseparable from the nature of animal life and existence ES 49 must be shown in relation and comparison to the other four senses Third the existence of instinct in man and animal in the sense of innate programmed behavior suggests the possibility of complementing the inadequacies inherent in Hume s empiricism Like many other enlightenment philosophers Smith also pays attention to Cheselden s report 1 on a young gentleman who was born with a cataract and whose sight was restored through an operation Following recovery however it was found that his prior touch-acquired knowledge of particular objects did not accord with his new sight-acquired knowledge and so he at first learned to know and again forgot a thousand things in a day When the young gentleman saw a painting with perspective and a variety of paints its plain surface led him to ask which was the lying sense feeling or seeing? After observing a superb landscape at Epsomdowns one year later he called it a new kind of seeing Smith interprets the case thus:
Though it may have been altogether by the slow paces of observation and experience that this young gentleman acquired the knowledge of the connection between visible and tangible objects; we cannot from thence with certainty infer that young children have not some instinctive perception of the same kind In him this instinctive power not having been exerted at the proper season may from disuse have gone gradually to decay and at last have been completely obliterated Or perhaps what seems likewise very possible some feeble and unobserved remains of it may have somewhat facilitated his acquisition of what he might otherwise have found it much more difficult to acquire ES 69
What Smith wants to insist here is this: whilst long and harsh experiences of training are indispensable in making use of the faculty of sight human beings must have some innate instinctive perception that is free from any experiences if they are to connect visual and tactile knowledge consistently 2 This is nothing but a distinct critique of pure and simple empiricist epistemology since Smith said that antecedent to all experience the young of at least the greater part of animals possess some instinctive perception of this kind seems abundantly evident ES 70 While the linnet and the thrush feed their young by dropping food into their bills the hen does not Since the young partridge and goose also seem to feed themselves immediately upon hatching they seem to understand the language of Vision as well as they ever do afterwards Smith says therefore this is the case so far as I have been able to observe with those of at least the greater part of the birds which make their nests upon the ground with the greater part of those which are ranked by Linnaeus in the orders of the hen and the goose and of many of those long-shanked and wading birds which he places in the order that he distinguishes by the name of Grallae ES 70
On the other hand the greater proportion of those organisms ranked by Linnaeus in the orders of the hawk the magpie and the spar-row seem to emerge from the shell blind continue to be so for at least some days thereafter and are fed through the joint labor of both parents However before leaving the nest they evidently enjoy all the powers of vision in the most complete perfection Smith therefore concludes that in so short a period they cannot be supposed to have acquired those powers from experience and must therefore derive them from some instinctive suggestion ES 71 This kind of instinct is not confined to the bird The young of quadrupeds such as the cow and the horse like those of the greater proportion of birds that make nests upon the ground seem to enjoy the faculty of sight just after birth Even the young of the human species who spend enough time in the arms of their mothers for learning the principle of association of ideas by observation and experience must have the same instinct since Nature it may be said never bestows upon any animal any faculty which is not either necessary or useful and an instinct of this kind would be altogether useless to an animal which must necessarily acquire the knowledge which the instinct is given to supply long before that instinct could be of any use to it ES 74 Smith therefore says thus:
Children however appear at so very early a period to know the distance the shape and magnitude of the different tangible objects which are presented to them that I am disposed to believe that even they may have some instinctive perception of this kind; though possibly in a much weaker degree than the greater part of other animals A child that is scarcely a month old stretches out its hands to feel any little play-thing that is presented to it It distinguishes its nurse and the other people who are much about it from strangers It clings to the former and turns away from the latter Hold a small looking-glass before a child of not more than two or three months old and it will stretch out its little arms behind the glass in order to feel the child which it sees and which it imagines is at the back of the glass It is deceived no doubt; but even this sort of deception sufficiently demonstrates that it has a tolerably distinct apprehension of the ordinary perspective of Vision which it cannot well have learnt from observation and experience ES 74
Smith s examination of the sense of sight is notably different from Berkeley s in the sense that Smith elucidates the perspective vision of infants as an innate instinct that is distinct from the associationist principle of empiricism; Berkeley s treatment of it on the other hand is limited mostly to a mechanical inquiry of sight as the outcome of an optical device or machine Smith s argument is much strengthened by the fact that in the case of the newborns of all suckling animals of Mammalia they begin immediately sucking through the use of the sense of smelling regardless of sight capabilities Although they seem to draw their nourishment through tubes and canals like a vegetable in the womb as soon as they come into the world this new set of tubes and canals which the providential care of Nature had for a long time before been gradually preparing is all at once and instantaneously opened and they require filling The smell of the sub-stance which is fitted for filling them increases and irritates that uneasy sensation and produces hunger or the appetite for food ES 77-78 It is worth noting here that Smith s observations probably assisted by Linnaeus s thoroughgoing descriptions of animals generic and specific characters are tolerably accurate and appropriate and his understanding that an uneasy sensation of being unfilled or the appetite for food has its origins in the function of each bodily organ While the human species consists of an organic unity of different organs the mind Smith seems to explain is activated not only by the different sensations of the organs but also by the formation of new connections among them in the absence of experience This is not a mechanical or machine view of an animal of self-motion but rather a biological or evolutionary view of them for he sought to combine instinct with experiences in growth Besides this the following statement shows clearly that Smith s approach was also a psychological one:
All the appetites which take their origin from a certain state of the body seem to suggest the means of their own gratification; and even long before experience some anticipation or preconception of the pleasure which attends that gratification In the appetite for sex which frequently I am disposed to believe almost always comes a long time before the age of puberty this is perfectly and distinctly evident The appetite for food suggests to the newborn infant the operation of sucking the only means by which it can possibly gratify that appetite It is continually sucking It sucks whatever is presented to its mouth It sucks even when there is nothing presented to its mouth and some anticipation or preconception of the pleasure which it is to enjoy in sucking seems to make it delight in putting its mouth in the shape and configuration by which it alone can enjoy that pleasure There are other appetites in which the most unexperienced imagination produces a similar effect upon the organs which Nature has provided for their gratification ES 79
It is abundantly evident that what Smith here calls the appetite or anticipation or preconception of the pleasure is in short the instinctive or innate faculty of cognition While some anticipation of the pleasure is premised it exists as the cause for continuing to suck rather than starting to suck Instinct is therefore the principle which teaches the child to mould its mouth into the conformation and action of sucking even before it reaches the object to which alone that conformation and action can be usefully applied ES 80 Citing the fact that there are among the Worms in Linnaeus s classification some animals that have scarcely a head and neither eyes nor ears but nonetheless have the power of self-motion and move about in search of food Smith summarizes the concept of instinct thus:
A new-born animal which had the power of self-motion and which felt its body either agreeably or disagreeably more heated or more cooled on the one side than on the other would I imagine instinctively and antecedently to all observation and experience endeavour to move towards the side in which it felt the agreeable and to withdraw from that in which it felt the disagreeable sensation But the very desire of motion supposes some notion or preconception of externality; and the desire to move towards the side of the agreeable or from that of the disagreeable sensation supposes at least some vague notion of some external thing or place which is the cause of those respective sensations ES 85
The above citation gives evidence of why Smith insisted neither man nor animal was ever born without the Sense of Touching which seems essential to and inseparable from the nature of animal life and existence ES 49 Smith here reconfirms that the consciousness of the positional distinction between the internality and externality of a substance is an indispensable sense for all animals including Worms The distinctive ability to distinguish between the internality and the externality of a substance is definitely vital for individual animals The senses that find externality agreeable or not therefore are different from anything else in a utilitarian sense since those sensations appear to have been given us for the preservation of our own bodies even though the agreeableness of Heat and Cold has been found from experience ES 86 :
The desire of changing our situation necessarily supposes some idea of externality; or of motion into a place different from that in which we actually are; and even the desire of remaining in the same place supposes some idea of at least the possibility of changing Those sensations could not well have answered the intention of Nature had they not thus instinctively suggested some vague notion of external existence ES 86 Smith applies the same biological understanding to the sense of Hearing He is much disposed to the belief that Sound may instinctively and antecedently to all observation and experience obscurely suggest some vague notion of some external substance or thing which excites it Although Sound is merely perceived in the ear by a sense receptor all animals and especially men are too careful and cautious about unusual and unexpected sounds Smith interprets this response to unusual sounds thus: This effect too is produced so readily and so instantaneously that it bears every mark of an instinctive suggestion of an impression immediately struck by the hand of nature which does not wait for any recollection of past observation and experience ES 87
This reasoning explains Smith s conclusions in ES: the three senses of Seeing Hearing and Smelling seem to be given to us by Nature not so much in order to inform us concerning the actual situation of our bodies but as concerning that of other external bodies-which though at some distance from us may sooner or later affect that actual situation and eventually either benefit or hurt us ES 88 Smith s conclusions might be in short summarized as follows: all the sensations of animals whether independent or composite sensations must not be understood as the effects of experience and observation alone: some kind of instinct includes not only real information of one s standing but also futurity concerning self-preserva-tion This conception of instinct seems completely consistent with the current biological understanding of it Ethologist Konrad Lorenz says that the recognition of an enemy-which in mallards and many other birds is an inborn instinct-must be learned personally: An animal which does not know its enemy by instinct is informed by older and more experienced fellow-members of its species who or what is to be feared as hostile
Lorenz 1952 2002 133 137 Even the most primitive protists have an apparatus for sensing and responding to the dangers and opportunities they encounter in their habitat More than a billion years of natural selection have elaborated the genetic program of the human species from that of a simple protozoan into that of mankind Thus the new biological understanding of the nature of genetic programs has finally explained what for such a long time had been a great mystery for the philosophers Mayr 1997 74
Although Smith naturally had no knowledge of the nature of genetic programs in modern biology that was still the issue for him Smith s original concern in ES was epistemology-that is the reason why sensory organs generated completely different sensations from the material characters of the -that is the mechanism of an optical device of Sight Unlike Berkeley Smith confronts the biological matters of instinct in animals according to many elaborate observations of the sensational and cognitive development process of young animal and human species and he raises serious doubts about rigorous empiricist interpretations of external senses The novel original but faint idea that all animals must be born with an innate instinct to receive and process various sensations-something like a heredi-tary program in the brain-must result from an inquiry into the unknown principles and intermediate causes of external senses not from the viewpoint of a transcendentalist but from a rigorous empiricist
II Instinct and Experience in Perception: The Early Psychological Approach
Smith s conception of instinct somewhat resembles the ideas of contemporary leaders of biological science like Linnaeus and Buffon although they refer not to instinct but internal sense in cases where external sense is the topic While Linnaeus refers to the external and internal senses Engel-Ledeboer and Engel 1964 26 no explicit or concise explanation is provided It can safely be said that the internal senses had previously indicated the neural system and brain and the external senses the bodily organs but external and internal senses was replaced by sensory organs after the 10th edition of Systema Naturae in 1758 Judging from the argument that individuals lack in their prime and tender age absolutely all knowledge and are forced to learn everything by means of their external senses Engel-Ledeboer and Engel 1964 18 Linnaeus seems not to have any exact notion of instinct
In Histoire Naturelle Buffon discusses internal senses at large in The Natural History of Man and external senses mainly in A Dissertation on The Nature of Animals While Buffon indicates that the internal sense is equal to the mind vol 3 98 and that the nerves are the immediate instruments of feeling vol 3 286 his fundamentally physiological and complicated ex-planation of the internal and external senses appears explicitly in the following quotation:
The internal sense differs in the first place from the external senses by the faculty which it possesses of receiving every species of impression; while the external senses are only affected in one mode corresponding to their conformation: the eye for instance is not more affected with sound than the ear with light Secondly the internal sense differs from the external senses by the duration of the vibrations excited by external causes In every other article both these species of senses are of the same nature The internal sense of a brute as well as its external senses is pure results of matter and mechanical organization Like the animal man possesses this internal material sense; but he is likewise endowed with a sense of a very different and superior nature residing in that spiritual substance which animates us and superintends our determinations vol 3 496-97
There is no indication that Smith accepted Buffon s explanation of internal and external senses Moreover it is clear that Smith was critical of this kind of philosophical and pseudo-physiological interpretation of the internal sense given his criticism of such an explanation of the Sensation of Taste in ES: Certain juices of the exciting body are supposed to enter the pores of the palate and to excite in the irritable and sensible fibers of that organ certain motions or vibrations which produce there the Sensation of Taste But how those juices should excite such motions or how such motions should produce no philosopher has yet attempted nor probably ever will attempt to explain to us 37
Then it can therefore be safely said that Smith embraced little of the interpretation of the internal and external senses that had been made by preceding natural philosophers 3 instead establishing a modern concept of instinct independently according to his various observations Besides neither Linnaeus nor Buffon adopts instinct as a key concept in their theories They seem therefore to take at best a midwife role for Smith s advancement of biological thinking
The concept of instinct however cannot be limited to biology Since sense itself is the main subject of psychology and the critical subject touching the core of philosophy Locke and Hume each naturally take the term instinct into consideration While Locke uses the term instinct instinctu in the sense of impulse or drive in his Essays on the Law of Nature he explicitly denies such notions in the Human Understanding as innate laws of nature and innate practical principles Locke 1693 1995 I iii 2-3 ; he declares that the word instinct has no significance nor do the words sympathy or antipathy Ibid III xi 8 Locke s argument-that God spoke to man that is directed him by his Senses and Reason as he did the inferior Animals by their Sense and Instinct which he had placed in them to that purpose to the use of those things which were serviceable for his Subsistence and given him as means of his Preservation Locke 1698 2002 205 -shows obviously that instinct is a distinguishing mark of animals that lack reason Having much knowledge of the classification of plants studied during his formative years Sloan 1972 21 Locke uses not a few biological metaphors in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding Unlike Smith however Locke s observation of the development of a newborn child simply leads him to the ultimate empiricist interpretation of perception: the assumption of a blank paper tabula rasa brain Locke 1693 1995 II i 2:20-22 Locke intends to explain how the mind works and how the human species comes to know truth Pinker 2002 5 but he has no intention of explaining how the mind emerges Hume on the other hand repeatedly insists that animals and humans alike learn from experiences and have some form of instinct Besides his concept of instinct seems to be closer to an innate faculty than Locke s since he says that as justice evidently tends to promote public utility and to support civil society the sentiment of justice is either derived from our reflecting on that tendency or like hunger thirst and other appetites resentment love of life attachment to offspring and other passions arises from a simple original instinct in the human breast which nature has implanted for like salutary purposes Hume 1751 2004 III 40 So long as Hume argues that though the instinct be different yet still it is an instinct which teaches a man to avoid the fire; as much as that which teaches a bird with such exactness the art of incubation and the whole economy and order of its nursery Hume 1748 1999 IX 6 his views of instinct and of the continuity between animals and the human species seem to be perfectly consistent with modern biology-based understandings Hume s conception of instinct however is not liberated from the confusion of reason with instinct since he insists that reason is nothing but a wonderful and unintelligible instinct in our souls which carries us along a certain train of ideas and endows them with particular qualities according to their particular situations and relations This instinct tis true arises from past observation and experience Hume 1739-40 2001 1 3 16 9 Here one can see that the distinction between the innate faculty program and the learned faculty fades into ambiguity Nevertheless it may be worthwhile to note that Hume s observations of animal behavior are on rare occasions no less accurate and keen than those of Smith After enumerating a number of specific animal behaviors to show their particular excellence Hume concludes that pride and humility are not merely human passions but extend themselves over the whole animal creation and says thus:
The causes of these passions are likewise much the same in beasts as in us making a just allowance for our superior knowledge and understanding Thus animals have little or no sense of virtue or vice; they quickly lose sight of the relations of blood; and are incapable of that of right and property: For which reason the causes of their pride and humility must lie solely in the body and can never be placed either in the mind or external objects But so far as regards the body the same qualities cause pride in the animal as in the human kind; and tis on beauty strength swiftness or some other useful or agreeable quality that his passion is always founded Hume 1739-40 2001 2 1 12 5
In short Hume s conclusion that all the internal principles that are necessary in us to produce either pride or humility are common to all creatures Ibid 2 1 12 9 are nothing but results of the method of enquiry which is found so just and useful in reasoning concerning the body to our present anatomy of the mind Ibid 2 1 12 2 Then what is confirmed sufficiently is the fact that Smith s view of instinct with all his premature thinking is far more consistent with modern biological insights than Locke s or Hume s whose empirical analyses were performed mainly from psychology and philosophy-based aspects and with fewer biological insights and observations It is however a matter of course that the term biology here refers to understanding behavior according to the genetic program while the term psychology refers to understanding behavior according to the work of the mind or physiological cause-and-effect
III Conceptual Elaboration of Instinct and the Propensity to Exchange
Even if the above remarks are supportable and persuasive it must nonetheless be admitted that no definite conclusion can be drawn from them before verifying that Smith used them consistently in his early and late writings This procedure seems indispensable in providing clues to the dating of Of External Senses Smith s first use of that term appears in LER:
Both of them Mandeville and Rousseau however suppose that there is in man no powerful instinct which necessarily deter-mines him to seek society for its own sake: but according to the one the misery of his original state compelled him to have recourse to this otherwise disagreeable remedy; according to the other some unfortunate accidents having given birth to the unnatural passions of ambition and the vain desire of superiority to which he had before been a stranger produced the same fatal effect According to both those laws of justice which maintain the present inequality amongst mankind were originally the inventions of the cunning and the powerful in order to maintain or to acquire an unnatural and unjust superiority over the rest of their fellow creatures LER 11
While Smith does not here define the term instinct positively he seems to believe firmly that there is in man a powerful instinct which necessarily determines him to seek society for its own sake Although most contemporary Scottish thinkers asserted that human sociality was instinctive or appetitive Berry 1997 25 Smith s understanding of instinct seems to go beyond Hume s view of it in the sense that even Hume had become enmeshed in the conventional meaning of instinct as a wild animal passion or emotion We find the same usage in The Theory of Moral Sentiments 1759; TMS hereafter although there the expression is slightly different from that used in LER:
Though man be naturally endowed with a desire of the welfare and preservation of society yet the Author of nature has not entrusted it to his reason to find out that a certain application of punishment is the proper means of attaining this end; but has endowed him with an immediate and instinctive approbation of that very application which is most proper to attain it The oeconomy of nature is in this respect exactly of a piece with what it is upon many other occasions Nature has constantly in this manner not only endowed mankind with an appetite for the end which she proposes but likewise with an appetite for the means by which alone this end can be brought about for their own sakes and independent of their tendency to produce it Thus self-preservation and the propagation of the species are the great ends which Nature seems to have proposed in the formation of all animals TMS II i 5 10 Two points are worthy of special attention here First Smith s arguments that the endowment of the Author of nature is nothing but an instinctive approbation of the welfare and preservation of society constitute indeed a radical critique of both Mandeville and Rousseau since both of them conclude that laws of justice are nothing but devices for maintaining an unnatural and unjust superiority despite their opposing preconception of the natural state Notwithstanding his theological style of description Smith s formula of instinct-pleasure/reason-punishment is biological since it does not contradict Darwin s theory of evolution Smith believes that all animals including humans have an implanted end of self-preservation and propagation of the species universally Who implanted it-be it the Author of nature or nature itself-matters not to him Second the concept of instinct as an innate trait in the first edition of TMS continued to be maintained even in 1790 Below are three passages from the supplemented portion of the sixth edition There seems to be in young children an instinctive disposition to believe whatever they are told Nature seems to have judged it necessary for their preservation that they should for some time at least put implicit confidence in those to whom the care of their childhood and of the earliest and most necessary parts of their education is intrusted Their credulity accordingly is excessive and it requires long and much experience of the falsehood of mankind to reduce them to a reasonable degree of diffidence and distrust TMS VII iv 23
Here the meaning of implanted program of instinct is expressed clearly recalling a similar argument on children s instinctive apprehension of the ordinary perspective of Vision as developed in ES 4 The concept of instinct is more thoroughly elaborated upon to suggest the innate or implanted features of the child without using the term inherited A similar recognition reveals itself in the second quotation below Those unfortunate persons whom nature has formed a good deal below the common level seem sometimes to rate themselves still more below it than they really are By an instinct of pride however they set themselves upon a level with their equals in age and situation; and with courage and firmness maintain their proper station among their companions By an opposite instinct the idiot feels himself below every company into which you can introduce him Some idiots perhaps the greater part seem to be so chiefly or altogether from a certain numbness or torpidity in the faculties of the understanding But there are others in whom those faculties do not appear more torpid or benumbed than in many other people who are not accounted idiots But that instinct of pride necessary to support them upon an equality with their brethren seems totally wanting in the former and not in the latter TMS VI iii 49
Considering the continuity and increase of conceptual maturity of instinct between the first edition 1759 and the sixth 1790 it must be natural for us to estimate that the dating of ES especially the latter part of it is later than 1759 and much earlier than 1790-probably after 1768 when the 12th edition of Linnaeus s Systema Naturae was completed However the exact date of writing ES would be provably later than 1768 if we were to compare Smith s interpretation of propensity to exchange in WN with instinct in TMS In the third quotation Smith says thus:
The desire of being believed the desire of persuading of leading and directing other people seems to be one of the strongest of all our natural desires It is perhaps the instinct upon which is founded the faculty of speech the characteristical faculty of human nature No other animal possesses this faculty and we cannot discover in any other animal any desire to lead and direct the judgment and conduct of its fellows TMS VII iv 25
There are two decisive points of interest here First the desire of being believed persuading leading and directing other people is treated as an instinct Second the faculty of speech that distinguishes the human species is founded upon the social instinct of humans This new insistence on instinct upon which is founded the faculty of speech appears first in the 1790 edition of TMS and affords us an important clue not only for achieving a more accurate dating of ES but also for understanding the true and ethological meaning of the propensity to truck barter and exchange in WN
The term instinct never appears in WN In the opening paragraph of Chapter 2 of its Book 1 Smith refers not to the instinct to truck barter and exchange but to the propensity to truck barter and exchange : 5 This division of labour from which so many advantages are derived is not originally the effect of any human wisdom which foresees and intends that general opulence to which it gives occasion It is the necessary though very slow and gradual consequence of a certain propensity in human nature which has in view no such extensive utility; the propensity to truck barter and exchange one thing for another WN I ii 1
Then it will be necessary to establish whether instinct and propensity are the same so as to be interchangeable or not A clue to a possible answer to this question is found in the very next sentence:
Whether this propensity be one of those original principles in human nature, of which no further account can be given; or whether, as seems more probable, it be the necessary consequence of the faculties of reason and speech, it belongs not to our present subject to enquire It is common to all men and to be found in no other race of animals which seem to know neither this nor any other species of contracts WN I ii 2
Considering that the italics in this passage were not included in Early Draft of part of The Wealth of Nations 6 ED hereafter and appear first in WN it seems appropriate to suppose that Smith probably tried to decide whether this propensity was a matter of instinct or a necessary consequence of the faculties of reason and speech without realizing the anticipated result but failed to do so However as pointed out in the discussion of the third quotation Smith distinctly expresses in the sixth edition of TMS his new belief that the faculty of speech is founded on the social instinct of humans-that is on the desire of being believed the desire of persuading of leading and directing other people Then it can be safely said that Smith s conception of instinct at the time of writing WN had not yet matured to the level of evolutionary epistemology or had been still in bewilderment; therefore he was forced to be satisfied with some vague conception of propensity to exchange at that time This appears to be positive evidence that the latter and more substantial part of ES was written before 1776 while writing WN since the treatment of instinct in the latter part of ES continues to be premature level rather than the very clear conception laid out in 1790-the latter of which showed the most advanced and mature conception of instinct in line with that of modern biology In other words Smith s confidence in the terminology was not entirely strong prompting him to deliberately choose not to decide whether the propensity to exchange was the original principles in human nature in WN It therefore seems appropriate that the dating of ES is 1768-1775
IV Concluding Remarks
The connection between instinct and the propensity to exchange then is summarized as follows While the propensity to exchange is founded on the instinct of the social animal to seek out and enjoy the company of other group members-and thus demands the mental capacity to keep track of given and received favors-humans exchange more things than mere favors The propensity to exchange is therefore a special trait of the human species which has the faculty to distinguish slight differences among things in addition to faculties relating to the making of contracts languages are indispensable here record-keeping and accounting Smith s concept of instinct in ES as examined above demands some more or less intrinsic programs of all animals-programs that are indispensable for the self-preservation and the propagation of the species 7 In contrast the propensity to truck barter and exchange might properly be the necessary consequence of the faculties of reason and speech That is to say this propensity is not instinct but the product of very long experiences so that it may supposedly be called ethnological instinct of humans In relation to this due attention should be paid again to Smith s assertion in 1790 that the faculty of speech which characterizes human nature is founded upon the social instinct-powerful instinct which necessarily determines him to seek society for its own sake-of humans and also to Charles Darwin s evolutionary interpretation of the connection between social instinct and sympathy 8 Putting all accounts together it may well be said that Smith had already established the modern evolutionary epistemology substantially by 1790
Smith s concept of the propensity to exchange therefore does not stay on the simple level of instinct so far as members within a group exchange favors with each other According to the modern biology-especially evolutional ethology social animals like chimpanzee and bonobo definitely seek and enjoy company de Wall 1996 170 and behave on the principle of reciprocal exchange or reciprocal altruism because individuals have the mental capacity to keep track of given and received favors and can apply this capacity to almost any situation Ibid 153-54 Smith s positive recognition of the continuity of reciprocity among members is it must be observed reflected in his insistence: it is by treaty by barter and by purchase that we obtain from one another the greater part of those mutual good offices which we stand in need of WN I ii 3
In relation to self-love however it must be observed that the self-interest mentioned by Smith on the propensity to exchange is nothing but the other member s self-love Self-love is understood rather as an external and relative principle which interests other member s self-love than as an internal prin-ciple which works separately and independently Man has almost constant occasion for the help of his brethren and it is in vain for him to expect it from their benevolence only He will be more likely to prevail if he can interest their self-love in his favour and shew them that it is for their own advantage to do for him what he requires of them Whoever offers to another a bargain of any kind proposes to do this WN I ii 2
So far as the propensity for exchange gives foundation upon which WN was written it must not be overlooked that this properly human propensity is the consequence of both self-interest and sociability-social instinct At that time Smith had not clear understanding between them yet Accordingly the concept of instinct is more general broad and basic than the propensity to exchange since the former is common among all social animals To put it slightly differently the propensity to exchange cannot be released without social instinct of animals In this sense and in this sense only Smith follows and accepts Hume s insistence that reason is nothing but a wonderful and unintelligible instinct in our souls which carries us along a certain train of ideas and endows them with particular qualities according to their particular situations and relations Hume 1939-40 2001 1 3 16 9 although he does not accept Hume s insistence that this instinct tis true arises from past observation and experience Ibid Smith s conception of instinct as affirmed above rigorously excludes all em-pirical sentiments and knowledge Smith s own advancement lies in his evolutionary way of understanding human traits; that the human species has not only the fundamental instinct of other social animals but also the additional tracking inclination or disposition grown on it through succeeding experiences 9 One thing however still requires attention It is very easy for us to find population thinking 10 indispensable to the evolutional biology in Smith s evolutionary argument that in the mechanism of a plant or animal body every thing is contrived for advancing the two great purposes of nature the support of the individual and the propagation of the species But in these and in all such objects we still distinguish the efficient from the final cause of their several motions and organizations TMS II ii 3 5 This shows explicitly Smith s adequate comprehension of the developmental process of Nature So long as reciprocity or reciprocal altruism of human being grows into the propensity to exchange the achievement of the final cause of the self-preservation and the propagation of species will be achieved since independent and free pursuits of self-love by individuals progressively increase the common stock of the population by the division of labor
The strength of the mastiff is not in the least supported either by the swiftness of the greyhound or by the sagacity of the spaniel or by the docility of the shepherd s dog The effects of those different geniuses and talents for want of the power or disposition to barter and exchange cannot be brought into a common stock and do not in the least contribute to the better accom-modation and conveniency of the species Each animal is still obliged to support and defend itself separately and independently and derives no sort of advantage from that variety of talents with which nature has distinguished its fellows Among men on the contrary the most dissimilar geniuses are of use to one another; the different produces of their respective talents by the general disposition to truck barter and exchange being brought as it were into a common stock where every man may purchase whatever part of the produce of other men s talents he has occasion for WN I ii 5 which has for its objects the qualities actions or states of the mind itself as the external senses have things external These two classes of sensation external and internal furnish our whole store of ideas the materials about which we exercise that noblest power of reasoning peculiar to the human species Hutcheson 1747 1990 6 It is certain that Smith does not follow his teacher Hutcheson in this respect 4 In order to show the similarity I would like to adduce a sentence from ES It seems difficult to suppose that man is the only animal of which the young are not endowed with some instinctive perception of this kind The young of the human species however continue so long in a state of entire dependency they must be so long carried about in the arms of their mothers or of their nurses that such an instinctive perception may seem less necessary to them than to any other race of animals Children however appear at so very early a period to know the distance the shape and magnitude of the different tangible objects which are presented to them that I am disposed to believe that even they may have some instinctive perception of this kind; though possibly in a much weaker degree than the greater part of other animals ES 74 5 There is an exception of it and Smith uses the expression the trucking disposition WN I ii 3 In Lectures on Jurisprudence: Report of 1962-3 LJ A hereafter however the disposition to truck barter and exchange is used but in Early Draft of part of The Wealth of Nations supposedly written in 1762 the propensity to truck barter and exchange is used 6 In ED Smith said thusly This division of labour from which so many advantages result is originally the effect of no human wisdom which foresees and intends that general opulence to which it gives occasion It is the necessary tho very slow and gradual consequence of a certain principle or propensity in human nature which has in view no such extensive utility This is propensity common to all men and to be found in no other race of animals a propensity to truck barter and exchange one thing for another That this propensity is common to all men is sufficiently obvious ED 21 7 This condition seems strict one in Smith since the trait being common to puppy dogs and humans to act according to his inclinations endeavours by every servile and fawning attention to obtain their brethren s good will WN I ii 2 is not mentioned as instinct in WN 8 It seems better to quote directly from Darwin: Social animals are impelled partly by a wish to aid the members of their community in a general manner but more commonly to perform certain definite actions Man is impelled by the same general wish to aid his fellows; but has few or no special instincts He differs also from the lower animals in the power of expressing his desires by words which thus become a guide to the aid required and bestowed The motive to give aid is likewise much modified in man: it no longer consists solely of a blind instinctive impulse but is much influenced by the praise or blame of his fellows The appreciation and the bestowal of praise and blame both rest on sympathy; and this emotion as we have seen is one of the most important elements of the social instincts Sympathy though gained as an instinct is also much strengthened by exercise or habit As all men desire their own happiness praise or blame is bestowed on actions and motives according as they lead to this end; and as happiness is an essential part of the general good the greatest-happiness principle indirectly serves as a nearly safe stand-ard of right and wrong As the reasoning powers advance and experience is gained the remoter effects of certain lines of conduct on the character of the individual and on the general good are perceived; and then the self-regarding virtues come within the scope of public opinion and receive praise and their opposites blame Darwin 1871 1874 611 9 It seems worthwhile to note Thomas Reid who strongly attacked Hume s empiricism Reid recognized the importance of instinct as a constituent power of the mind and utilized that conception of that instinct to combat Humean skepticism Wood 1989 98 But Reid s conception of instinct is quite different from Smith s Reid viewed instinct as a blind impulse to actions mechanically and physiologically Breathing sucking and swallowing of a new-born child butting of a bull kicking of a horse biting of a dog therefore constitute instincts for their self-preservation by God Reid s argument that the merciful author of our nature has adapted our instincts to the defects and to the weakness of our understanding Reid 1788 1969 108 evidently indicates his fundamental position is not biological but philosophical 10 E Mayr s remark seems very important Darwin eliminated any reliance on supernaturalism and provided the explanatory models that made this possible Equally important was his refutation of essentialism and its replacement by population thinking It established a new emphasis on variation on a potential for change and on the uniqueness of individuals It was this population thinking that made the theory of natural selection possible 
